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Abstract: 
 
In this interlinked contract land market is tied with labour market. The landlord leases-out 
small size of land to the landless agricultural labour households under fixed rent system 
prior to agricultural peak season on the basis of their commitment to work under his field 
through out that season. A household can bind itself in such a contract if and only if it has 
certain number of family labour force. But which households can ultimately tie them in 
such a contract is totally decided by the market force in that village economy where the 
family labour force is the determining factor. The paper also shows that this interlinked 
contract may generate involuntary unemployment in the agricultural labour market and 
under certain conditions the tied households can not only cross the reservation level of 
income but also can cross the poverty line. 
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Introduction: 
          The problem of interlinkage in the agricultural labor market is widely known. It 
was Bardhan and Rudra (1978) who during their village survey had observed the 
existence of labour cum credit contracts in many villages of West Bengal. According to 
their findings, workers are employed in the peak season after being offered consumption 
loan in the lean season at subsidized rate of interest. Two important theoretical 
explanations of credit labour interlinked contract were developed by Basu (1984) and 
Bardhan (1984). Basu explained this interlinkage in the light of Lender’s risk hypothesis 
and Bardhan explained this in the light of Employer’s Risk Hypothesis. According to him 
the landlord presumes that there may be excess demand for labour at the agricultural peak 
season i.e. during the time of sowing and harvesting. In order to remove this uncertainty 
he provides consumption loan to the workers on the basis of their pre-commitment to 
work in his field in the next peak season. Sarap (1991) in his intensive village level 
survey in the Sambalpur district had observed that the agricultural labourers mainly take 
loan from the landlords or from the professional moneylender for consumption purposes. 
Gupta (1987) explained this interlinkage from different angle. He explained that on the 
basis of consumption-efficiency argument. He told that due to lagged consumption 
efficiency relationship the landlord prefers to give consumption loan to the labourer in 
the agricultural slack season on the basis of his commitment to work in his field in the 
next peak season. According to him, this may help the landlord to get more nourished 
worker in the agricultural peak season. Kundu and Chatterjee (1998) had shown that, this 
type of interlikage would be possible if and only if the landlord can force the labourer to 
take his food only at his residence. This can only check the moral hazard problem of this 
nutrition based credit labour interlinked contract.  
  Actually all the models of interlinkage in the rural credit markets, ultimately the agent 
or the peasant or the agricultural labourer is by assumption pressed down to a given 
reservation utility and so the agent does not gain anything from the interlinked contract. 
Bell (1988) had shown that the peasant might be worse off with an interlinked set of 
transactions than with a set of separate bilateral bargain. Actually, most of the literatures 
of interlinked contract are related with credit markets. Again no theoretical model is yet 
developed to show that the agent or the peasant can cross the poverty line after binding 
himself in an interlinked contract. Here we want to develop a new type of interlinked 
contract where land market is tied with labour market. To secure labourers at crucial 
times, cultivator households use this tenancy-labour interlinked contract. Using this type 
of interlinked contract we want to answer why family farm either owner or tenant 
operated can be continued to be a more dominat mode of agricultural production 
organization than large scale farms based on hired labour in the low-income developing 
economies. 
         The landlord (the big farmer or small farmers who possess more than three hector 
land) wants to lease-out certain portion of land (generally not more than one acre land) to 
the labourer against fixed rent and cultivate the remaining portion of the land with the 
help of hired labour. Actually the landlord feels that it is difficult to monitor the effort the 
labourers pay in the field during the time of cultivation, which will also affect the level of 
output. Distribution of land in many fragments and the difficulty of its management also 
force the landlord in this type of interlinked contract. Moreover it ensures the availability 
of labourers from tenant families when required. All lessors belong to big landowners 
who want to cultivate the land with the help of hired labour. Inability to appoint a 
permanent labour or lack of effective family labour that can constantly monitor the hired 
labourers in the field is the main cause behind that. So, they prefer to lease out certain 
portion of land to any other person because they know, from that part of land, they can 
get certain amount of return at the end of the agricultural season. The leessees belong to 
the agricultural labour household. In the presence multiple cropping, the concept of 
agricultural slack season is gradually disappearing. But the agricultural labourers are 
facing lots of uncertainties at the time of getting job in the agricultural sector. One of the 
major reasons behind that is the gradual increase of marginal farmers. These marginal 
farmers prefer family farming on the one hand and ready to work as an agricultural 
labourer in his leisure day on the other hand. So fall of demand and rise of supply in the 
agricultural labour market creates uncertainty for the main agricultural labourers to get 
job in the agricultural peak season. Sometimes it has been observed that it is difficult for 
an agricultural labourer to get 150 full days of employment annually even in the multiple 
cropping areas. So sometimes they face shortage of money to purchase essential 
commodities mainly rice.  The existing literature of credit-labour interlinkage, described 
that in this situation they have to demand loans from the landlords and professional 
moneylenders mainly for consumption purposes. They now prefer to take land in lease 
from the landlords so that they can cultivate that with the help of family labour force. The 
tenancy contract is under fixed rent contract. At the end of the season, they have to pay 
the rent to the landlord and keep the remaining portion for self-consumption. This also 
helps the tied labourers cum tenants to maintain the subsistence level of consumption as 
well as the nutritional level. Apart from this they can generate personal rapport with the 
landlord and using that they can get employment in the landlord’s field during 
agricultural peak-season. The tied labourers also avoid shirking because they know that if 
they are caught, then he will not be renewed in this type of contract in the next year. The 
landlord now can avoid the appointment of permanent labour in the agricultural peak 
season if tied labourers do the cultivation. Employment of migrant labour is costly 
because apart from wage, food and shelter also have to be arranged for them. Kundu and 
Chatterjee(2001), using consumption efficiency hypothesis had shown that the landlords 
always prefer local to migrant labourer during the time of cultivation because the former 
can be tied in a nutrition based credit labour interlinked contract. This tie-up of tenancy 
labour interlinked contract can help the landlord to give him nutritious labourer during 
that crisis period. Actually this type of interlinked contract can benefit both the landlord 
and the tenant. But whether the labourer is willing to take the interlinked contract or not 
mainly depends on his families’ able-bodied members. In the previous literatures, little 
alternative options were available to the labourers or peasants. They have to tie 
themselves in the interlinked contract for survival purposes. But in this model the 
labourer has other two options i.e. working purely as an agricultural labourer or working 
in the non-farm sector. Actually it is observed that the labourers are not willing to send 
their wives to work in the landlord’s field as an agricultural labourer but always 
encourage her to help him during the time of cultivation of the leased-in land. Sometimes 
their children also help them to do that. So in this model the able-bodied family members 
imply the family labour force. Here we assume that each family possesses only one 
working member who works as an agricultural labourer outside and all the members are 
homogeneous in nature. The paper is divided in to three sections. In Section-1 we shall 
discuss the situation at which an agricultural labour household will be eager to take land 
in leased-in form for cultivation with the help of family members at the beginning of the 
agricultural peak season for certain specific time period. In Section-2 we shall discuss the 
behaviour of the employer-cum landlord and investigate what strategies he will follow to 
maximize his gain. And in Section-3, we shall determine the value of family labour force 
at which this tenancy-labour interlinked contract will be sustained in equilibrium.  
Section-1 
The Model: 
Initially we assume that there two types of economic agents in the village economy. The 
Landlord who owns T amount of land and the agricultural labourer who apart from doing 
work as a daily casual agricultural labourer also wants to cultivate few plot of land as a 
tenant under fixed rent system with the help of his family members. The total number of 
able-bodied working members (both male and female) of the agricultural labour 
household is '  but only the male member of the household can work outside. The 
female able-bodied members and children are not allowed by the family to work outside. 
The household takes‘t’ amount of land as leased-in from the landlord for cultivation with 
the help of family labourers. Under fixed rent contract, the rent is ‘R’ against per unit of 
leased-in land. The remaining produced crop is used for self-consumption by the 
agricultural labour household. The tenant also works under the landlord as an agricultural 
labourer where the daily wage paid to the labourer is a combination of cash and food and 
the labourers have to take their food at their work site. So total payment in form of wage 
'n
in a particular day becomes xww +=ˆ
10
. Here ‘w’ is the payment made in form of cash 
and ‘x’ is the payment made in form of kind and the price of ‘x’ is set to be unit.  
<< β
..........βntdx
)(tc=
'Rt
ˆ)( wdte +−
    The nutritional efficiency of the labourer depends on ‘x’ and following instantaneous 
consumption efficiency argument, the efficiency function of each labourer can be 
expressed as e where βxx =)( . The total number of days the labourer works 
under the landlord is ‘d’. So the nutritional efficiency function of each labourer in any 
particular season can be expressed as  .As the labourer household has ‘n’ 
number of working members and each lagricultural labour household takes ‘t’ amount of 
land in leased in form, the total agricultural production function of the household can be 
explained as  
βdxxE =)(
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 The cost of cultivation is where c 0&0 >′′>′ cc
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. The total payment the tenant 
has to make in form of rent is '  and the total wage income of the household where 
only one member works as an agricultural labourer is .  If the price of the produced 
crop is set to unit then the total earning of the household becomes: 
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                                                                          [ 0&0,0,0' >′′>′>′′> eecc ] 
 
Here '  is the effort and opportunity cost sacrificed by the tenant and other family 
members during the time of cultivation of the leased-in land. 
'e
The tenant cum labourer can only decide ‘t’. So we have  
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we can claim that the above relation (3) gives the 
maximum value of ‘t’ say .   
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So we can have the following propositions: 
Proposition:1. The total amount of land the household will be interested to leased in is 
positively related with the total number of able bodied working members of that 
household.  
           The landlord has a belief of consumption efficiency argument and wants to give 
‘x’ as much as possible. But as he is giving meal to the labourer only at lunch, he cannot 
exceed ‘x’ beyond . Here we can consider  as the maximum amount the landlord can 
pay in order to offer the most nutritious meal to the interlinked labourer in lunch. 
Actually, it has been empirically observed that during lunch, the labourer is offered a 
meal with a well-balanced combination of carbohydrate protein fat, vitamin minerals etc.  
xˆ xˆ
As  is totally decided by the Panchayat the landlord has no control on w . He can only 
control the nutritional efficiency of the labourer through offering him . Here 
instantaneous consumption-efficiency relationship is considered. So it is obvious that, 
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So the indirect total earnings function of the household becomes 
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So TEAS curve with respect to ‘n’ is positively sloped and convex. 
      The worker apart from binding them into a tenancy labour interlinked contract can 
work as a plain casual agricultural labourer. Here also the wage income is same but these 
casual labourers can work more days than the interlinked labourer. Let the number of 
days the casual labourer can get employment be  and the total wage income of the 
labourer as well as the agricultural labour household in any particular agricultural season 
becomes . We can write that as 
1d
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The average number of days a main agricultural worker can get employment in a specific 
year is just higher than that of interlinked labourer. The reason behind that is, the main 
agricultural labourers can devote full effort to find job in the agricultural season and 
always available. But the interlinked labourer has an involvement in cultivation in his 
leased-in land. So he is not always available for work through out the agricultural season. 
Hence    )( 1dd <
    The worker can work in the non-farm sector where all the working members of the 
family can be involved in the non-farm occupation. Here, the output or earnings totally 
depends on manpower of the family. Here the capital is supplied by ‘Mahajan’. The 
family with the help of their efficiency and manpower produces the commodity and 
returns the finished goods to the supplier of raw materials and receive a certain amount. 
So the total earnings of a family from non-farm sector i.e. TE  can be expressed as  NF
                      where )(nTENF Ψ= 0)(&0)( <Ψ ′′>Ψ′ nn  when 3nn ≤         
         and               = TE  when n  *NF 3n≥
 Hence we see the existence of surplus labour in the family at the time of producing non-
farm commodity when  3nn ≥
Suppose we consider the minimum value of ‘n’ be 1. 
If that labourer works as a main agricultural labourer then his total wage income of the 
household will be         
                                                )(1 xwdET AL += …(  )when 1=n …………..(7).  
If the household with single member works as a labourer as well as tenant with the help 
of the sole-able bodied member, then its earnings from the interlinked contract becomes 
                 wdtetRtcdxtET AS ˆ)()( +−−−= β    (where att ,t =  )1=n …….(8) 
If the household works as non-farm labourer, then at 1=n , the earnings will be  
                                  )1(Ψ== FET NF …………………………(9) 
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 Now we know that initially both TE  and TE  are positively related with . But if 
we consider that 
AS NF ''n
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Then we see in Fig-1, that the TE  will cut TE  from above. As we have already 
assumed that there exists only one male agricultural labourer of the household who works 
outside as a casual labour, TE  is parallel to the axis represented by ‘ ' . In Fig-1 we 
have two switch points i.e.,  and beyond e a family will be eager to take land in 
lease for cultivation and bound itself in interlinked contract provided it has at least n  
number of workable members of the family. 
NF
2e
AS
2
AL
1 &e
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2ˆ
   In that figure z indicates the poverty line and it is measured as per capita family 
income. So when the total family member of a household is just one then the poverty line 
will be z . Beyond that the poverty line will be upward sloping with slope z . Here we 
assume that the maximum number of family members of the household is  where 
. The main agricultural labourer household is lying below the poverty line and 
due to lack of technical efficiency and capital the family involved in the non-farm sector 
can never cross the poverty line also. In the above figure, a family can cross the poverty 
line only through interlinked contract provided it has 
+n
],1[ +∈ nn
2
~n number of workable family 
members (which is observed through the switch point ) in Fig-1. This switch point will 
occur if and only if  
3e
z
dn
dTEAS >  i.e. the marginal revenue of the tenant household with 
respect to family labour force should be more than z  . In the Fig-1 it is clear that 
NFTE *>AS zdn
dTE > . 
So Fig-1 shows that a labour household can cross the poverty line provided he bounds 
himself in tenancy labour interlinked contract. At this situation the household should 
have 2~n  number of able-bodied workable family labour force and has to take t
~   amount 
of land in lease from the landlord.  
If we ignore the poverty line then the agricultural labour household will be able to 
involve himself and his family in a tenant labour interlinked contract provided   
           …………………….(12) ALTEwdteRttcxtdn ≥+−−− ˆ)()(ˆˆ2 β
Following Fig-1, that will happen when   2nˆn ≥
   We also have  gives t  when …..(13) wdteRttcxtdntMax ˆ)()(ˆˆ)( 2 +−−−= β tˆ= 2nˆn =
So if a family wants to bind itself in interlinked contract it will take at-least t amount of 
land in leased-in form and that can be taken provided it has at least number of family 
labour force. 
ˆ
2nˆ
Section-2 
The objective of the landlord now is to decide the total number of tenants to whom  lands 
will be given in lease i.e. . Here it is assumed that N R is administered and that is 
decided by the panchayat or is given exogenously. Actually here the landlord wants  
number of labourers in to a tenancy-labour interlinked contract through giving them at 
least  amount of land. Total work force is assumed to be equal to total number of 
tenants. This can keep the tenant at the reservation level of earnings. Battese, Coelli and 
Colby (1989) considered both the family and the hired casual labour as homogeneous 
inputs. But Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1983), considering the district level data, had 
shown that family labour and hired casual labour cannot be perfectly substitute with each 
other. In fact according to them, family labour is more productive than hired casual 
labour in Indian agriculture. There is an inclination of the hired labour on shirking. So to 
check this moral hazard problem the landlord has to employ permanent labour through 
out the season. To minimize this problem during the time of cultivation there is an 
inclination of the landlord to tenancy-labour interlinked contract. We have already proved 
that, an agricultural labour household will tie himself in an interlinked contract provided 
it has number of family labour force and at that situation it will demand at least t  size 
of land for cultivation. At that situation, the landlord has to cultivate the remaining 
 size of land with the help of number of tied labourers whenT .  
N
tˆ
nˆ
tˆN
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)
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The production function of the landlord is under constant return to scale and can be 
expressed as  Y . As the price of the agricultural commodity is set to 
unity the profit function of the landlord from the interlinked contract can be expressed as  
γβα )ˆ()ˆ( xNdtNT −=
    ………….(14) 1),ˆ(ˆˆˆ)ˆ( =+−−+−−= γαβγγγα whentNTCtNRNwdxdNtNTTELL
   The landlord has a belief on consumption efficiency argument. So he always prefers not 
one but few number of labourers because he knows that tenant with small portion of land 
will devote maximum effort to produce maximum amount of output in that field and this 
will help the landlord to extract predetermined amount of fixed rent from the tenants with 
certainty. So he always prefers to lease out small portion of land to more than one tenant. 
Hence  in the presence of interlinked contract we can cosider .  1>N
The first order condition derived from (14) gives 
)14......(0ˆ)ˆ(ˆˆˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ ˆ
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This will give the optimum value of say . N *N
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So, maximum  number of agricultural labourers are brought under the interlinked 
contract when each tied labourer will cultivate only amount of land.  
*N
tˆ
Now from (14A), if we also have,  
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The above relation indicates, if the landlord has to give more than t  size of land to a 
single tenant, then automatically the landlord has to bind less number of agricultural 
labourers into interlinked contract provided the above condition holds.  
ˆ
    Next, we have to derive the conditions at which this tenancy labour interlinked contract 
will always be preferable to the landlord than any other alternative.  
If the landlord wants to avoid the interlinked contract, then he can cultivate his land 
totally with the help of hired casual labourers. The hired casual labourer will be a 
combination of both casual local labour and migrant labour. The wage rate of the migrant 
labourer is assumed as  and we also assume that . But the payment made in 
form of kind remains unchanged. We also assume that maximum  number of local 
labourers can be employed in the production activity through out the season on casual 
basis. As the landlord is cultivating his total land with the help of hired labour, more than 
 number of labourers are required and migrant labourer can fulfill that deficiency. 
Suppose the total number of migrant labourers employed in the production process be 
denoted as . Apart from employing migrant labourer, the landlord is forced to bear 
the cost of migration and that can be expressed as C  Again to monitor the 
Mw wwM ˆ≥
(MM NC=
*N
*N
MN
).M
hired labourers, the landlord now has to employ a permanent labourer through out the 
season and the total payment to the permanent labourer is . At this situation the net 
earnings of the landlord becomes 
Pw
(C−
*
Tˆ−β
)ˆ =
)16....())(**ˆˆ)*(* PMMMMLM wNTCNdwNwdxdNNTTE −−−−+= βγγγα  
Here we assume that the landlord can employ maximum  number of local labourers. 
If the maximum  number of migrant labourers are employed by the landlord, then 
the landlord will still prefer the interlinked contract provided TE   and that 
will happen if and only if  
N
*MN
LMLL TE ** >
)17.....(ˆˆ*ˆ*)ˆ()({*)(** TRxdNxdNTTCTCwNCNdw PMMM +>−+++ βγγγαγγα
Mw )( MNC PwThe above inequality will hold if and only if ,  and will take quite higher 
value i.e. if wage of the migrant labourer, cost of bringing migrant labourer in that area 
and the wage of the permanent labourer becomes very high. 
The landlord may lease out his total land to a single farmer. In that situation his earnings 
will become T   .ˆ RTELR =
Now TE  provided  LRLL ET ˆ>
)18....(..........().........(*ˆ)(ˆ* TtNTwhereTTRNwdTCxdNT −−>−−βγγα  
The left side of the above inequality gives the net earnings gained by the landlord through 
interlinked contract and the right side of the inequality gives the total rent sacrificed by 
the landlord. If the gain is more than the sacrifice, then the landlord will always prefer 
this interlinked contract. 
If the two conditions mentioned in (17) and (18) hold, then the landlord will always be 
interested in tenancy-labour interlinked contract. 
If maximum N* number of labourers are available in that rural economy then it is not 
possible for the landlord, to distribute total ' 'T  size of land giving  size to each one i.e. 
we can say that 
tˆ
*ˆ Nt ≤T . 
If the landlord offers only  size of land to each N* tenants then the households who 
have at least n number of family labourforce can get the benefit of this interlinked 
contract. But this interlinked contract will keep those households at the reservation level 
of earnings and with this it is not possible for them to cross the poverty line 
tˆ
2ˆ
z . To know 
at which value of '  the above tenancy-labour interlinked contract will ultimately held 
we have to consider both the labour demand curve and labour supply curve. 
'n
<2
 Section-3 
If we look at Figure-2A and Figure-2B, we observe an upward raising curve representing 
the relationship between t  (from relation (4)) and a downward sloping curve 
representing the relationship between t  (from relation (15)) respectively. When 
, each tenant is given only t  size of land and total N* number of labourers are tied 
into interlinked contract. Again each tenant will be given t size of land provided the 
landlord prefers the households with n  number of family labour force. At that situation 
altogether  number of tenants will be tied into interlinked contract. Combining 
Figure-2A and Figure-2B, we can draw Figure-2C which shows different combinations of 
the landlord prefers in his interlinked contract. From the figure it is clear that the 
relationship between are negative provided n . The curve Figure-2C can 
be called N
n&
N
N&
N
2nˆn =
Nn &
ˆ
+
+n
+
+N
n & ≤≤ n2ˆ
DnD curve or the demand curve of  with respect to . .  n
Now we have to see the availability of the agricultural labour households with different 
family size in the village who, can be tied into interlinked contract. Actually after the 
breakdown of the joint family system, the family size of most of the households is not 
high. As there is only one earning member of the family, the total available labourforce  
N can come from households with different family size. We assume that the relationship 
between  is positive when nN & nn ≤≤1  and negative when +≤≤ nnn . So the curve 
NSNS1NS2 in Figure-3 represents number of different households with different family 
size. We assume that at n=n  the maximum number of households in the village is N*. 
We also assume that total number of households with only 1 member in the family and 
number of members in the family is same and that is+n N each. 
Now we super impose the demand curve drawn in Figure-2C on Figure-3 to get the 
equilibrium value of ' . In the Figure-3 'n +> NN . As we know from Figure-1 that 
. Now if 1ˆ2 >n nnˆ n < , then equilibrium point occurs at E1 when the downward 
sloping labour demand curve cuts upward slopping supply curve from above. In this 
situation the households with  number of family labour force will be tied into 
interlinked contract. As in the figure we can claim that the existing tied 
*2n
,ˆ* 22 nn >
households can keep themselves above the reservation level of earnings. But all the local 
labourers fail to get job at this situation and the problem of involuntary unemployment 
will arise in the agricultural labour market and that is N1N*. Nearer the difference 
between nn &ˆ2 less will be the involuntary unemployment generated in the agricultural 
labour market and that will totally disappear when nn =2ˆ . If it is observed that 
22
~* nn ≥ then we can claim that the tied households can also touch (cross) the poverty 
line. But if nn >2ˆ
*12
, then from Figure-3, it is clear that the problem of involuntary 
unemployment will become more acute in the agricultural labour market and equilibrium 
value of ' will occur at very near to or at  . In Fig-3 it is observed that when the 
demand curve is N
'n
nˆ
+n
D2nD1 then the equilibrium occur at E2 and the households who 
possesses  number of family labour force can only be tied them in interlinked 
contract. Total number of such households is N2.  Considering 2
1
22
11
2
~*&ˆ* nnnn >>  it 
can be concluded that the tied households cannot only cross their reservation level of 
earnings but also can cross the poverty line. But the problem of involuntary 
unemployment now becomes more acute and becomes N*N2. 
     Concluding observations: 
     In the village community we see the constant interaction between the landlord and the 
tenant. The landlords mainly play a dominant role in the village economy. The landlord 
in this type of interlinked contract prefers short period under fixed rent system. The fixed 
rent system also encourages the tied tenant to get maximum output from the field because 
they know that, working only as an agricultural labourer it will be difficult for him to 
maintain even a subsistence level of consumption. But an agricultural labour household 
can bind himself in an interlinked contract provided it has certain number of family 
labour force. Otherwise he will opt to work purely as an agricultural labourer or in the 
non-farm sector. If it is observed that sufficient number of families with a required 
number of family labour forces is available in the village economy then all the tied 
households will be ultimately kept at reservation level of income and the problem of 
involuntary unemployment will disappear. Other wise in the presence of shortage of 
interested agricultural labour households with required number of family labour force the 
problem of involuntary unemployment will emerge. At this situation the tied households 
now can keep themselves above the reservation level of income. Again in our model if 
the equilibrium number of family labour force determined in the village economy at 
which the interlinked contract actually happens exceeds 2~n  then we can conclude the tied 
households not only can keep themselves above the reservation level of income but also 
are able to cross the poverty line through interlinked contract.                                                    
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